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Shenzhen Olax Technology CO.,Ltd
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Shenzhen OLAX Technology Co.,Ltd , which Located in Shenzhen, China. OLAX Technology established in 2010, It is a leading domestic supplier of wireless communication terminal technology solutions and equipment.Our main products are 4g C P E WIFI routers, USB WIFI dongles, modems. Pocket WIFI hotspot.G S M and C D M A fixed wireless telephones, terminals, Moreover, we support card lock, network lockand SIM card security.We have a core team with more than ten years of experience in R & D, sales ...
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Advanced automatic machines, strictly process control system. We can manufacture all the Electrical terminals beyond your demand.
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USIM in 5G (NR) system (1)
1.UE and UICC In the mobile communication system defined by 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project), the user's terminal (UE) device is composed of: ME (mobile equipment) + UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card); where UICC is a Physical cards that are tamper-proof and resistant to software and hardware attacks. 2. UICC and USIM UICC can contain multiple applications, one of which is USIM; USIM securely stores and processes all sensitive data related to the user and home network. USIM is under the control of the home network operator; the operator selects the data to be configured in the USIM before issuance and remotely manages the USIM in the user's device through the OTA (over-the-air) mechanism. 3.USIM in 5G 3GPP defines USIM for the 5G system in Rel-15 for access and use in 3GPP and non-3GPP networks, allowing UE (user equipment) external data networks. USIM is defined in Rel-16 as network slice specific authentication. 4.First-time authentication is a mandatory procedure to allow UE (user equipment) to access 3GPP or non-3GPP networks. EAP-AKA' or 5G-AKA are the only authentication methods that allow primary authentication and the subscription credentials are always stored in the USIM when the terminal supports 3GPP access functionality. For primary authentication based on AKA, the mutual authentication performed in the USIM and the generation of the key material (integrity key IK and confidentiality key CK) sent by the USIM to the ME remain unchanged compared to 3G, 4G and Meets 3GPP TS 33.102 specification [3]. Changes in 5G Primary Authentication USIM include storing new security context and additional keying material in USIM (depending on the USIM's configuration). 4.1 5G support If the USIM supports storing 5G parameters, the ME will store the new 5G security context and the new keys defined for the 5G key hierarchy (i.e. KAUSF, KSEAF and KAMF) in the USIM. USIM can store a 5G security context for 3GPP access networks and a 5G security context for non-3GPP access networks. Storing the security context and key material in the USIM ensures faster reconnection when roaming (UICC moves from one ME to another). 4.2 NPN support Authentication in private networks (called independent non-public networks) can rely on the EAP framework supported by the 5G system; user equipment and service networks can support 5G AKA, EAP-AKA' or any other key generation EAP authentication method, where: ·When using AKA-based authentication methods, clause 6.1 of 3PPTS 33501[1] applies. ·When selecting an EAP authentication method other than EAP-AKA', the selected method determines the credentials required in the UE and network. How these credentials for EAP methods other than EAPAKA' are stored and processed within the UE is beyond the scope. But to ensure a high level of security for access to private networks, private network operators may decide to require the presence and use of a UICC containing USIM applications in order to securely store and process subscription credentials for EAP methods such as EAP-AKA' or EAP-TLS . 5. Secondary authentication This is an optional authentication based on EAP, conducted between UE (user equipment) and DN (external data network). Although the choice of EAP authentication method and credentials is beyond the scope of 3GPP, external data networks may decide to protect access to their DN by performing strong authentication thanks to the EAP-AKA' or EAP-TLS authentication method, UICC in the user device The presence of USIM on the DN securely stores and processes the credentials used to access the DN. Network Slice Specific Authentication Using network slice specific authentication between the user device and the AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) server to access the network slice is optional. Network slice specific authentication is based on the EAP framework and its user ID and credentials are different from the 3GPP subscription credentials. It follows the mandatory primary certification. Stakeholders deploying slices may decide to install USIM on the UICC of user devices to ensure a high level of security to access their slices and prevent the emergence of unauthorized users.
SIM Technology Innovation: An In-Depth Look at eSIM and vSIM
01.eSIM   eSIM, known as Embedded-SIM, or Embedded SIM, is a programmable, electronic SIM card technology whose main feature is that it does not require a physical slot, but rather an embedded chip that is integrated directly into the device's circuit board or inside other devices. Hardware part_     Integrated Circuit (IC) Chip: At the heart of the eSIM is a small IC chip that is built into the device's motherboard, similar to a physical SIM card. It contains the necessary hardware (CPU, ROM, RAM, EEPROM and serial communication unit) for storing and processing SIM data.   Software part_     Operating System (OS): The eSIM chip runs a dedicated operating system, often referred to as eUICC (Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card), which manages the SIM's functions, including data storage, secure processing and communication.     eSIM Production Process   ① Chip Manufacturing ② Chip testing ③ Integration into devices ④ Embedded software loading ⑤ Functional testing and verification   Virtual SIM (vSIM) is a SIM card technology without a physical form factor that allows devices to realize communication functions through software, including SoftSIM, CloudSIM, and others.   02.Virtual SIM (vSIM)   Virtual SIM (vSIM) is a SIM card technology without a physical form factor that allows devices to realize communication functions through software, including SoftSIM, CloudSIM, and others.   SoftSIM controls the information written to SoftSIM through the terminal provider, and the user purchases and uses communication services directly through the software without the intervention of the operator, which cuts off the direct connection between the user and the operator.   CloudSIM is a kind of SIM card function realized based on cloud computing technology, where users use network services on their devices through cloud services.   03.SIM service activation process   CloudSIM integrates the traffic resources of each operator into the cloud, selects operators according to the signal and network quality of different regions, and pushes them to the terminals to provide users with the best network services. The inclusion of multiple operators facilitates users to flexibly choose more favorable packages.       Do you want to learn more about SIM cards and other communication topics? We will continue to share more about this! See you in the next issue!
NTN Challenges for Random Access (Continued: Timer Conflicts)
In competitive random access, after a terminal (UE) receives a RAR message and sends a request for RRC connection establishment, whether it receives permission to establish the connection is crucial for determining the success of the competition. In the NTN scenario, the duration of the contention resolution timer presents another challenge for the terminal (UE).   I. Timer Challenges: During the RACH process, after the terminal (UE) sends the RRC connection request MSG3, it waits for the contention resolution message MSG4 to determine whether its random access attempt was successful. The duration for which the UE listens for MSG4 is controlled by the ra-ContentionResolutionTimer – this timer starts immediately after MSG3 is sent. In NTN systems, the distance between the UE and the satellite base station is much greater, resulting in significantly higher round-trip delays compared to terrestrial systems. While the maximum configurable value of the ra-ContentionResolutionTimer can theoretically cover these longer delays, this approach is inefficient and may unnecessarily consume power at the UE. NTN typically requires energy-efficient operation, especially in remote or battery-constrained applications. Therefore, the default settings of the ra-ContentionResolutionTimer must be adjusted to better accommodate NTN propagation delays while conserving UE power.   II. Potential Solution: One solution is to introduce an offset for the start of the ra-ContentionResolutionTimer in the NTN scenario. The timer would not start immediately after MSG3 transmission, but only after an offset period that accounts for the expected round-trip delay in NTN. This adjustment ensures that the timer is only active during the time period when MSG4 is expected to be received; by aligning the timer with the NTN-specific delay, the UE can avoid unnecessary monitoring during periods when MSG4 is unlikely to arrive. This saves power consumption and ensures compatibility with the longer latency of NTN. The advantages of offset-based timer adjustment include:   Power Efficiency: The UE only monitors when a message is actually likely to arrive, thus reducing unnecessary power consumption. Adaptability to Different Orbits: The offset can be configured according to the type of NTN (GEO or LEO), as the propagation delay differs significantly between these systems. Scalability: This method can adapt to NTNs of different scales and propagation delay characteristics without requiring significant modifications to the standard conflict resolution process. Robustness: Aligning the timer with the actual delay prevents the conflict resolution timer from timing out prematurely, which could otherwise lead to unnecessary retransmissions or failures in NTN communication.

2026

01/15

5G Terminal and AMF/SMF Interaction Information (2)
  In the 5G system, the AMF is responsible not only for terminal (UE) access and mobility management, but also for processing and notifying other units about terminal (UE) service requests and data transmission. The key points of the interaction with related networks during this process are as follows:   I. The AMF is responsible for SMF selection according to the procedures described in clause 6.3.2; for this purpose, it obtains subscription data from the UDM as defined in that clause. In addition, it obtains the subscribed UE-AMBR from the UDM and, based on the operator's local policy, obtains the dynamic service network UE-AMBR (optional) from the PCF; then it sends it to the (R)AN as defined in clause 5.7.2; AMF-SMF interaction supporting LADN is defined in clause 5.6.5.   To support billing and meet regulatory requirements (NPLI (Network Provided Location Information) as defined in TS 23.228 [15]) related to IMS voice call establishment, modification and release or SMS transfer, the following provisions apply:   If the AMF possesses the UE's PEI during PDU session establishment, the AMF will provide the PEI to the SMF. When the AMF forwards UL NAS or N2 signaling to a peer NF (such as SMF or SMSF) or during PDU session UP connection activation, it will provide any user location information received from the 5G-AN, as well as the AN access type (3GPP-non 3GPP) of the received UL NAS or N2 signaling. The AMF will also provide the corresponding UE time zone. In addition, to meet regulatory requirements (i.e., providing Network Provided Location Information (NPLI) as defined in TS 23.228 [15]); when the access method is non-3GPP, if the UE is still connected to the same AMF for 3GPP access (i.e., user location information is valid), the AMF can also provide the last known 3GPP access user location information and its validity period.   II.The SMF may further provide user location information, access type, and UE time zone to the PCF. The PCF can obtain this information from the SMF to provide NPLI to applications that have requested NPLI (such as IMS). User location information may include:   For 3GPP access: Cell ID, even if the AMF receives the primary cell ID from the auxiliary RAN node in NG-RAN, the AMF only includes the primary cell ID. For untrusted non-3GPP access: The local IP address used by the UE to connect to the N3IWF, and (if NAT is detected) the UDP source port number (optional).   III.Trusted non-3GPP   For trusted non-3GPP access: TNAP/TWAP identifier, the local IP address used by the UE/N5CW device to connect to the TNGF/TWIF, and (if NAT is detected) the UDP source port number (optional). When the UE connects to the TNGF using WLAN based on IEEE 802.11 technology, the TNAP identifier should include the SSID of the access point to which the UE is connected. The TNAP identifier should include at least one of the following elements, unless otherwise specified by the TWAN operator's policy: BSSID (see IEEE Std 802.11-2012 [106]); Address information of the TNAP to which the UE is connected.   IV. The TWAP identifier should include the SSID of the access point to which the NC5W is connected; unless otherwise specified by the TWAN operator's policy, the TWAP identifier should also include at least one of the following: BSSID (see IEEE Std 802.11-2012 [106]); Address information of the TWAP to which the UE is connected.   In addition: Multiple TNAPs/TWAPs may use the same SSID, and the SSID alone may not provide location information, but may be sufficient for billing purposes. It is assumed that the BSSID associated with the TNAP/TWAP is static.   V. User location information for W-5GAN access is defined in TS 23.316 [84]. When the SMF receives a request to provide access network information report, and there are no operations required to be performed on the 5G-AN or UE (e.g., no QoS flows need to be created/updated/modified), the SMF may request user location information from the AMF. The interaction between the AMF and SMF for the insertion, relocation, or removal of the I-SMF in a PDU session is described in Section 5.34.

2026

01/14

5G Terminal Interaction with AMF and SMF (1)
  In the 5G (NR) system, AMF and SMF are two independent core network functional units. They are directly connected via the N11 interface; the 5G terminal (UE) connects to them directly or indirectly through N1, N2, N3, N4, and N11 interfaces, and the information exchanged is as follows:   I. Messages exchanged with SMF via the N1 interface include: A single N1 termination point is located in the AMF; the AMF forwards SM-related NAS information to the SMF based on the PDU session ID in the NAS message. Subsequent SM NAS exchanges (e.g., SM NAS message responses) received by the AMF via access (e.g., 3GPP or non-3GPP access) are transmitted through the same access. The serving PLMN ensures that subsequent SM NAS exchanges (e.g., SM NAS message responses) received by the AMF via access (e.g., 3GPP or non-3GPP access) are transmitted through the same access. The SMF handles the session management part of the NAS signaling exchanged with the UE. The UE can only initiate PDU session establishment in the RM-REGISTERED state. When an SMF is selected to serve a specific PDU session, the AMF must ensure that all NAS signaling related to that PDU session is handled by the same SMF instance. After successful PDU session establishment, the AMF and SMF store the access type associated with that PDU session.   II. Messages exchanged with SMF via the N11 interface include: The AMF reports the UE's reachability to the SMF based on the SMF's subscription, including: location information of the UE relative to the area of interest indicated by the SMF. The SMF indicates to the AMF when the PDU session is released. After successful PDU session establishment, the AMF stores the identifier of the SMF serving the UE, and the SMF stores the identifier of the AMF serving the UE, including the AMF set. When attempting to connect to the AMF serving the UE, the SMF may need to apply the behavior described in Section 5.21 for "other CP NFs".   III​. Messages exchanged with SMF via the N2 interface include: Certain N2 signaling (e.g., handover-related signaling) may require the joint action of the AMF and SMF. In this case, the AMF is responsible for ensuring coordination between the AMF and SMF. The AMF can forward SM N2 signaling to the corresponding SMF based on the PDU session ID in the N2 signaling. The SMF should provide the PDU session type and PDU session ID to the NG-RAN so that the NG-RAN can apply the appropriate header compression mechanism to packets of different PDU types. See TS 38.413 [34] for details.   IV. N3 interface interaction messages with the SMF include: Selective activation and deactivation of existing PDU session UP connections are defined in clause 5.6.8 of TS 23.501.   V. N4 interface interaction messages with the SMF include: When the UPF learns that a UE has received downlink data but there is no downlink N3 tunnel information, the SMF will interact with the AMF to initiate a network-triggered service request procedure. In this case, if the SMF learns that the UE is unreachable, or that the UE is only reachable for regulatory priority services, and the PDU session is not for regulatory priority services, the SMF should not send a downlink data notification to the AMF;

2026

01/13