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Shenzhen Olax Technology CO.,Ltd
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Shenzhen OLAX Technology Co.,Ltd , which Located in Shenzhen, China. OLAX Technology established in 2010, It is a leading domestic supplier of wireless communication terminal technology solutions and equipment.Our main products are 4g C P E WIFI routers, USB WIFI dongles, modems. Pocket WIFI hotspot.G S M and C D M A fixed wireless telephones, terminals, Moreover, we support card lock, network lockand SIM card security.We have a core team with more than ten years of experience in R & D, sales ...
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Million+
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Million+
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Advanced automatic machines, strictly process control system. We can manufacture all the Electrical terminals beyond your demand.
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USIM in 5G (NR) system (1)
1.UE and UICC In the mobile communication system defined by 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project), the user's terminal (UE) device is composed of: ME (mobile equipment) + UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card); where UICC is a Physical cards that are tamper-proof and resistant to software and hardware attacks. 2. UICC and USIM UICC can contain multiple applications, one of which is USIM; USIM securely stores and processes all sensitive data related to the user and home network. USIM is under the control of the home network operator; the operator selects the data to be configured in the USIM before issuance and remotely manages the USIM in the user's device through the OTA (over-the-air) mechanism. 3.USIM in 5G 3GPP defines USIM for the 5G system in Rel-15 for access and use in 3GPP and non-3GPP networks, allowing UE (user equipment) external data networks. USIM is defined in Rel-16 as network slice specific authentication. 4.First-time authentication is a mandatory procedure to allow UE (user equipment) to access 3GPP or non-3GPP networks. EAP-AKA' or 5G-AKA are the only authentication methods that allow primary authentication and the subscription credentials are always stored in the USIM when the terminal supports 3GPP access functionality. For primary authentication based on AKA, the mutual authentication performed in the USIM and the generation of the key material (integrity key IK and confidentiality key CK) sent by the USIM to the ME remain unchanged compared to 3G, 4G and Meets 3GPP TS 33.102 specification [3]. Changes in 5G Primary Authentication USIM include storing new security context and additional keying material in USIM (depending on the USIM's configuration). 4.1 5G support If the USIM supports storing 5G parameters, the ME will store the new 5G security context and the new keys defined for the 5G key hierarchy (i.e. KAUSF, KSEAF and KAMF) in the USIM. USIM can store a 5G security context for 3GPP access networks and a 5G security context for non-3GPP access networks. Storing the security context and key material in the USIM ensures faster reconnection when roaming (UICC moves from one ME to another). 4.2 NPN support Authentication in private networks (called independent non-public networks) can rely on the EAP framework supported by the 5G system; user equipment and service networks can support 5G AKA, EAP-AKA' or any other key generation EAP authentication method, where: ·When using AKA-based authentication methods, clause 6.1 of 3PPTS 33501[1] applies. ·When selecting an EAP authentication method other than EAP-AKA', the selected method determines the credentials required in the UE and network. How these credentials for EAP methods other than EAPAKA' are stored and processed within the UE is beyond the scope. But to ensure a high level of security for access to private networks, private network operators may decide to require the presence and use of a UICC containing USIM applications in order to securely store and process subscription credentials for EAP methods such as EAP-AKA' or EAP-TLS . 5. Secondary authentication This is an optional authentication based on EAP, conducted between UE (user equipment) and DN (external data network). Although the choice of EAP authentication method and credentials is beyond the scope of 3GPP, external data networks may decide to protect access to their DN by performing strong authentication thanks to the EAP-AKA' or EAP-TLS authentication method, UICC in the user device The presence of USIM on the DN securely stores and processes the credentials used to access the DN. Network Slice Specific Authentication Using network slice specific authentication between the user device and the AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) server to access the network slice is optional. Network slice specific authentication is based on the EAP framework and its user ID and credentials are different from the 3GPP subscription credentials. It follows the mandatory primary certification. Stakeholders deploying slices may decide to install USIM on the UICC of user devices to ensure a high level of security to access their slices and prevent the emergence of unauthorized users.
SIM Technology Innovation: An In-Depth Look at eSIM and vSIM
01.eSIM   eSIM, known as Embedded-SIM, or Embedded SIM, is a programmable, electronic SIM card technology whose main feature is that it does not require a physical slot, but rather an embedded chip that is integrated directly into the device's circuit board or inside other devices. Hardware part_     Integrated Circuit (IC) Chip: At the heart of the eSIM is a small IC chip that is built into the device's motherboard, similar to a physical SIM card. It contains the necessary hardware (CPU, ROM, RAM, EEPROM and serial communication unit) for storing and processing SIM data.   Software part_     Operating System (OS): The eSIM chip runs a dedicated operating system, often referred to as eUICC (Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card), which manages the SIM's functions, including data storage, secure processing and communication.     eSIM Production Process   ① Chip Manufacturing ② Chip testing ③ Integration into devices ④ Embedded software loading ⑤ Functional testing and verification   Virtual SIM (vSIM) is a SIM card technology without a physical form factor that allows devices to realize communication functions through software, including SoftSIM, CloudSIM, and others.   02.Virtual SIM (vSIM)   Virtual SIM (vSIM) is a SIM card technology without a physical form factor that allows devices to realize communication functions through software, including SoftSIM, CloudSIM, and others.   SoftSIM controls the information written to SoftSIM through the terminal provider, and the user purchases and uses communication services directly through the software without the intervention of the operator, which cuts off the direct connection between the user and the operator.   CloudSIM is a kind of SIM card function realized based on cloud computing technology, where users use network services on their devices through cloud services.   03.SIM service activation process   CloudSIM integrates the traffic resources of each operator into the cloud, selects operators according to the signal and network quality of different regions, and pushes them to the terminals to provide users with the best network services. The inclusion of multiple operators facilitates users to flexibly choose more favorable packages.       Do you want to learn more about SIM cards and other communication topics? We will continue to share more about this! See you in the next issue!
5G Call – Terminal Subscription Data Acquisition and User Plane Settings
  Similar to previous generations of mobile communication, the services supported by the terminal (UE) are stored in the core network. The UE can only be executed by the radio network after completing authentication and encryption actions upon power-on. In 5G (NR) systems supporting NSSF (Network Slice Selection Function), after "RRC connection establishment, UE context, UE ID allocation, and security authentication," the terminal (UE) will obtain specific subscription data based on the activation status and perform user plane settings. The specific process is as follows:   I. Subscription Data Acquisition: The AMF searches for the NSSF (Network Slice Selection Function) through the N22 interface to select the best available network slice for the user's requested service. Then, it searches the UDM to retrieve all subscription data related to AM (Access Management), SM (Session Management), and UE (Terminal). The AMF connects to the UDM via the N10 interface to obtain subscription data. The process (message) is as follows: [21] Fill in the slice information in the PDU session establishment accept message [8] Obtain the AMF context based on the UE identifier [8] Obtain the SMF context from the mapping [20] Set the SMF context in the AMF context [8] The AMF creates a new UE context   ---The AMF configures the PCF (Policy Control Function) to retrieve the AM policy through the N15 interface accessible to the UE, and the SMF allocates services accordingly.   ---The AMF has collected all UE contexts, and now it creates another identifier for the UE, the AMF UE NGAP ID, to add it to the network.   II. User Plane Setup The AMF selects the SMF (which performs all session management operations in the 4G system MME (as well as SGW-C and PGW-C)) to manage all session management operations itself. Message exchange between the AMF and SMF is conducted through the N11 interface. The SMF then finds the best UPF (User Plane Function) for the UE and creates a session during the UL and DL data streams. Interaction between SMF and UPF is performed via PFCP (Packet Forwarding Control Protocol) on the N4 interface; the specific process (message) is as follows:   [3] Check the session ID of the existing PDU session [3] Send a PDU session establishment acceptance message to the UE and gNB [3] Send a PDU session resource establishment request message to the gNB [4] Process the PDU session resource establishment response [4] Process the PDU session resource release response [20] AMF processes PDU session establishment rejection [20] Send a PDU session rejection message to the UE [3] Set the session AMBR [20] Update the IP address information in the SMF context and send a downlink transmission message with a 5GMM reason to the gNB [3] [5] Retrieve the user QoS profile and UPF GTP TEID IP address from the SMF context [1] Send an activation PDU session context request message [5] Add a security header to the AMF PDU session transmission request [3] [6] Generate a new AMF NGAP UE ID [8] Notify NGAP of the new AMF NGAP ID

2025

11/20

5G Calls – Air Interface Security, RRC Reconfiguration, and Data Transmission
  Since 4G (LTE), mobile communications have implemented encryption and integrity protection during terminal (UE) access to ensure personal privacy and security during communication. The specific processes for these, along with service resources and data transmission, in the 5G (NR) system are as follows:   I. AS Security and RRC Reconfiguration: First, the AMF sends a UE Initial Context Establishment Request and Registration Acceptance Message to the gNB to update the UE context existing in the gNB. The gNB then performs the RRC reconfiguration and SMC procedures so that the UE can access the encrypted channel using derived keys (e.g., k-gNB, k-RRC, k-UP-int).   [17] AMF sends SAP [1] Update the GUTI assigned to AMF SAP [9] Process AMF AS SAP connection establishment request [9] [16] Process AMF AS SAP connection establishment rejection [9] Process AMF AS SAP connection establishment confirmation [18] Notify AMF AS SAP that it needs to send a security mode command message to the UE [9] Process AMF AS SAP security request primitive [17] Set security request when data is transmitted to the lower layer [1] Notify AS SAP that registration is rejected [10] Obtain a new security context from the upper layer [23] Encrypt/decrypt/decode Layer 3 NAS message [8] Register UE context [1] Execute registration signaling process [1] Process registration completion message [1] AMF sends registration acceptance message   II. Uplink (downlink) data transmission When the user plane is set to uplink or downlink purpose, the PDU session update message is transmitted from AMF to SMF. The specific process is as follows;   [3] Transfer gNB IP and TEID are stored in the corresponding SMF context [3] Session creation response message received from SMF [3] Prepare and send gN establishment response message to SMF via gRPC [9] QoS flow establishment list [20] Function to check if the maximum number of PDU sessions has been reached

2025

11/19

5G Call – Terminal RRC Establishment and Context Acquisition
In the 5G (NR) protocol stack, RRC (Radio Resource Control) is Layer 3, specifically responsible for the control and management of radio resource connections between the UE (UE) and gNB (gNB), including: establishing and managing connections, broadcasting system information, and processing mobility radio bearer configuration. 5G terminal RRC connections have three states: RRC_IDLE, RRC_CONNECTED, and RRC_INACTIVE; "RRC_INACTIVE" was introduced to improve battery efficiency and speed up reconnection.   I. RRC Connection Establishment Process: As shown in Figure (1), after power-on, the terminal (UE) initiates the establishment of an RRC connection with the gNB; subsequently, the gNB sends an initial NAS message to the AMF via the N2 interface, containing the RAN UE NGAP ID, UE context registration request, location information, 5G S-TMSI, and the reason for RRC establishment. Figure 1. RRC establishment process of 5G terminal (UE)   II. Initial NAS message + UE context reacquisition These parameters are the identity provided for the terminal (UE) to help the AMF obtain the UE context from the old serving AMF or by re-executing the entire process (only when the serving AMF cannot find traces of the old AMF); the whole process is completed through the N14 interface, and the specific process (message) is as follows: Figure 2. Initial NAS message and UE context of 5G terminal (UE)   [8] Release the previous registration request context [3] gNB sends the initial NAS message through the new RRC connection [23] Decode the security-protected NAS message [3][9] Process the NGAP initial UE NAS message [4] Process the initial UE message from NGAP [9] Mobility management message [16] Store the registration type in the parameters [1] Create the registration request process [9] Encode the initial NAS information message [7] Process the NAS encoded message and send it to the NGAP task [23] Decode the plain text NAS message [8] Check if there are old parameters (e.g. UE context (GUTI, IMSI, gNB ID, etc.) [3] Update AMF UE context with new gNB UE NGAP ID. Assuming the new AMF cannot find any old AMF traces in the network, it will be unable to close the NR call process. At this time, the AMF will begin identity, authentication, and security procedures for the UE in order to add a more explicit identity to the UE.

2025

11/18